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ABSTRACT
Life-extending treatment, in the form of artiﬁcial
nutrition and hydration, is often provided to people in
permanent vegetative states (PVS) in England and Wales
for many years, even when their family believes the
patient would not want it and despite the fact that no
court in the UK has ever found in favour of continuing
such treatment for a patient with a conﬁrmed PVS
diagnosis. The ﬁrst half of this article presents a close
analysis of the recent case of Cumbria NHS Clinical
Commissioning Group v Miss S and Ors [2016]
EWCOP 32. It examines the causes of delay in bringing
this case to court and reaching a ﬁnal judgment. It
draws not only on the published judgment, but also on
the two authors’ involvement in supporting the
family (before, during and subsequent to the court
hearings) as a result of their academic and
policy-related work in this area. This includes
conversations with the family and with members of the
clinical and legal teams, and observations in court. The
second part of the article draws out the ethical and
practical implications of the ﬁndings for theory and
policy and suggests ways forward in relation to (a) the
provision and inspection of care for these patients; (b)
legal practice in relation to ‘best interests’ and (c) the
perceived requirement under English law for a court
application before life-prolonging treatment can be
withdrawn from PVS patients—even in the absence of
any ‘in principle’ opposition.
INTRODUCTION
After suffering catastrophic brain injuries in August
2012 (at the age of 38), Miss S was given life-
extending treatments for nearly 4 years until May
2016. It was then that, following an application
from the Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG;
with the support of S’s family), Hayden J—who
heard the case in the Court of Protection—
approved the declaration that it was lawful and in
her best interests for artiﬁcial nutrition and hydra-
tion (ANH) to be withdrawn. This case is typical of
many other cases concerning patients in a
Permanent Vegetative State (PVS) that come before
the Court of Protection in that the patient received
life-extending treatment, in the form of a feeding
tube, for many years. It is a-typical, and a ‘land-
mark’ case, in that, at both the directions hearing
and at the substantive hearing, the judges expressed
concerns about avoiding unnecessary delays.i In the
ﬁnal judgment Hayden J said:
[T]he avoidance of delay in medical treatment
cases is an important imperative […] This is not to
say that assessments ought to be rushed or that
delays may not sometimes be clinically purposive,
but respect for a patient’s autonomy, dignity and
integrity requires all involved in these difﬁcult
cases to keep in focus that these important rights
are compromised in consequence of avoidable
delay. (para.13)
The nature of the ‘avoidable delay’ was not
addressed in court. Hayden J commented that he
“found it difﬁcult to understand entirely why this
process has taken quite as long as it has” (para 13)
but noted that he had not been required to investi-
gate the reasons. That is the task we take on here.
Identifying, and examining the causes of, ‘avoid-
able’ (as opposed to ‘clinically purposive’) delay is
important not only because of the ethical conse-
quences for S and for her family but also because
this analysis may help to avoid delays for future
patients.
OUR INVOLVEMENT
Our involvement in this case came about via our
academic work studying the social, legal and ethical
aspects of prolonged disorders of consciousness (ie,
vegetative and minimally conscious states). We also
have personal family experience of catastrophic
brain injury and have written—and spoken—pub-
licly about this1 and our status as ‘insider’ research-
ers means that other families have said they feel
that we will understand and empathise. In 2014 we
used our research to create an online resource2 to
support families and to provide information for
practitioners in this ﬁeld. Partly as a consequence
iWe had recently chaired an expert Working Party on
Practice Direction 9E to the Court of Protection Rules
2007, on the basis of which we wrote to the Court of
Protection Rules Committee recommending that
treatment withdrawal from patients in prolonged
disorders of consciousness should follow the legal and
professional guidelines laid down for all other patients,
permitting withdrawal without recourse to the courts if
clinicians determine that it is not in the patient’s best
interests (and if this is not contested). We also expressed
concern about the length of time it was taking for cases
such as these to be resolved by the courts and suggested
ways of streamlining the process. We await their response.
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of this, we have since been contacted by families concerned by
what they view as intolerable delays in the process of applying
to court for declarations that it would be lawful and in the
patients’ best interests for artiﬁcial nutrition and hydration to be
withdrawn.
We have provided informal support for several families in an
effort both to assist them and to ensure appropriate medico-
legal action for their relatives in compliance with the relevant
national clinical guidelines.3 Our support has included: pointing
family members to key sections of the national guidelines, the
Mental Capacity Act 2005 or recent case law; talking directly
with members of the patients’ clinical or legal teams; visiting
the patient; arranging contacts with neuro-rehabilitation and
legal experts; and providing direct support (eg, accompanying
family members to best interests meetings and to court
hearings).
In previous research we explored the experience of a wide
range of families with relatives in prolonged disorders of con-
sciousness—some of whom were ﬁghting for treatments to be
given, rather than seeking declarations that it would be lawful to
withhold them.2 4 We subsequently focused speciﬁcally on the
experience of those families involved in court applications for
withdrawal, again drawing on (mostly retrospective) interview
accounts.5 This article uses a different approach. We examine
just one case as it unfolded in real time—thereby enabling a pro-
spective, dynamic and contextual understanding of how delays
emerge and their effects on the family at points when subse-
quent events (and the eventual outcome) have not yet occurred.
This longitudinal approach enables “a nuanced understanding
of phenomena which evolve through time”.6
ETHICS, CONSENT AND LEGAL ISSUES
Detailed case studies such as the one presented here are unusual
—in part because publishing an article about such involvement
can raise complex ethical and legal issues. However, the need
for transparency is also well recognised by the Court of
Protection and as the judge explicitly acknowledged in his pub-
lished ﬁnal judgment in this case: “Decisions of this magnitude,
even where they reﬂect medical and family agreement, require
that they be available for public scrutiny, they concern us all”
(para. 22).
Everyone who informed this article has been provided with
the opportunity to give feedback on it and consent has been
obtained for all direct quotations. Because we draw on detailed
notes made during our attendance at the court hearings, we
shared a draft with the two judges involved in the case, neither
of whom has objected to its publication. The family members
involved (S’s mother, brother and daughter) fully support the
publication of this article and the use of their words. Miss S’s
brother, for example, wrote: “I am more than happy for my
quotes to be used”, adding, “I really appreciate the fact that you
have used [a particular quote]” [email to authors] and Miss S’s
mother stated: “I seriously hope that the whole case is eventu-
ally in the public domain as [we] have nothing to hide or be
ashamed of [and, without public discussion] nothing will change
and other families will probably experience some of the devas-
tating aspects we had to endure” [email to authors]. The patient
herself, ‘Miss S’, lacked capacity to give consent—but members
of her family believe she would have wanted it made public.
The court ban on identifying her expired 8 weeks after her
death (para. 23), just before publication of this article. We have
nonetheless avoided identifying her here as we feel that to do so
would not add anything of value to this article.
CASE SUMMARY
Our involvement in S’s case began in July 2015 when her
mother emailed us because she was distraught by the apparent
lack of progress in the application to the court for a declaration
that it would be lawful to withdraw ANH from her daughter.
She wrote: “I hope you don’t mind my contacting you person-
ally but the situation we are in is becoming so soul-destroying”.
Her daughter, she said, had a PVS diagnosis and the CCG had
agreed to take the case to the Court of Protection.ii
However, no date had been set for a court hearing even
though it was by then three years after her daughter’s injury.
She explained: “I have been at constant loggerheads…regarding
what I view as a failure of duty in the care provided” and “I
have lost faith in the ability of [those responsible] to carry out
efﬁciently the process of the application [to court]”. At this
point we had a long conversation with S’s mother and, at her
request, contacted the relevant health and legal teams on her
behalf, offering assistance from us and from specialist practi-
tioner colleagues.
The facts are as follows. In August 2012 Miss S suffered a
profound hypoglycaemic brain injury after overdosing on glicla-
zide (whether intentionally or by accident is unknown). She was
admitted to hospital unconscious and the Court judgment
records that she never again appeared to be aware of herself or
her environment (para. 6). Since there was no legally binding
Advance Decision to refuse treatment (and no Lasting Power of
Attorney for Health and Welfare), decision-making about S’s
medical treatment lay in the hands of the clinical team.
Decisions should have been based on their assessment of S’s best
interests—an important part of which is what the patient would
have wanted in these circumstances in line with her values,
wishes, feelings and beliefs (Mental Capacity Act 2005 s4(6)).
By April 2013, S’s mother was clear that her daughter would
not have wanted any further life-extending treatments and
wrote to the clinical team documenting her belief that S would
be “absolutely devastated” by her condition: “her quality of life
is nil” and “It is my own and her families (sic) wishes that her
life not be prolonged unnecessarily. […] She has the right to
pass away with peace and dignity” (letter given to treating team
on 13 April 2013). This should have triggered serious consider-
ation of whether or not it was in S’s best interests to continue to
receive artiﬁcial nutrition and hydration, and, if not, then how
to get an application ready for the Court of Protection in a
timely and efﬁcient manner. Instead, S (and her family) became
trapped in a maze of misinformation, mistakes and procrastin-
ation, leading to years of avoidable delay before treatment was
ﬁnally withdrawn in May 2016 nearly four years after S’s injury.
This long time lag occurred despite the best efforts of S’s family
to protect her from life-extending interventions that they
believed she would not want, and despite the fact that S could
already have been diagnosed as being in a PVS in early 2013.
FIVE AVOIDABLE DELAYS
We have identiﬁed ﬁve key ‘avoidable delays’ contributing to the
situation in which, for several years, S was given medical
iiSince Bland (Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 HL) an
application to the Court of Protection has been assumed to be a legal
requirement before ANH can be withdrawn from patients in PVS. It is
presented as a matter of good practice by the Mental Capacity Act Code
of Practice in England and Wales and this is also stated in Practice
Direction 9E to the Court of Protection Rules 2007 and the national
clinical guidelines—but all three of these documents involve a contested
interpretation of the law.
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treatment without any evidence that it was in her best interests
or anything other than futile. These ﬁndings are summarised in
ﬁgure 1 which presents an overview of the timeline of events
and in ﬁgure 2 which lists the key delay points in this timeline.
Avoidable delay 1 was caused by misinformation from
professionals about the time after injury at which a PVS
diagnosis can be made
In the face of family requests to let S “pass away with peace and
dignity” eight months after her injury, there was a formal best
interests meeting (13 April 2013), involving S’s family and key
members of the health care team, including the Mental Capacity
Lead for Cumbria Partnership Trust, a Community Macmillan
nurse and the patient’s GP. At this meeting the family were told
that S could not be diagnosed as being in a PVS until 1 year
after the precipitating event. This is incorrect. The vegetative
state cannot be diagnosed as permanent until 1 year after a
‘traumatic’ injury (eg, a blow to the head)—but this was not the
right timescale for S, who had a ‘non-traumatic’ (anoxic or
other metabolic) injury, meaning that she could potentially have
been diagnosed as permanently vegetative after 6 months.iii At
this stage, the clinical team could have been compiling the
necessary evidence for a court application. Instead, the ‘action
plan’ in the minutes from the best interests meeting was to
review diagnosis ‘closer to the 12 month stage’.
Avoidable delay 2 resulted from lack of advance planning
for the legal application
Not only was the clinical team wrong about the timescale for
diagnosing the vegetative state as ‘permanent’ for this patient,
they also failed to plan ahead for the application to the Court
of Protection. Even believing (incorrectly) that S could not be
diagnosed as PVS until a year post-injury, they could nonethe-
less—given the views expressed by S’s mother—have begun
initial preparations for a court application and booked the rele-
vant tests for the time at which they believed a ﬁrm diagnosis
might be possible. This was not done. Instead a ‘wait and see’
and ‘plan another meeting/review’ approach appears to have
been adopted with no sense of urgency in ensuring that the
treatment being provided was in her best interests.
Avoidable delay 3 was inexplicable tardiness in obtaining
independent expert assessments to conﬁrm the patient’s
diagnosis
Although some tests (including the Wessex Head Injury Matrix)
had been done between 6 and 12 months post-injury (and had
indicated nothing higher than a reﬂexive response level), the
additional expert diagnostic assessments the Court would need
were not carried out until July–August 2014—2 years post-
injury. This was in spite of there being no clinical reason for the
delay and in spite of the family pressing for such assessments to
take place as soon as possible. It was only after the results of
this assessment (using the Sensory Modality Assessment and
Rehabilitation Technique (SMART)) that S’s multi-disciplinary
team (MDT) agreed to ask the CCG to make an application to
court. Tardiness in obtaining these tests meant that the team did
not make this request until September 2014, more than two
years after the initial injury.
Avoidable delay 4 was a delay of more than a year between
the decision to make a court application and the date when
the application was actually made
Although the multi-disciplinary team agreed on 18 September
2014 formally to request that the CCG make an application to
the Court of Protection, this application was not actually made
until October 2015, 13 months later. We are not sure when the
CCG formally received that request, or when the solicitors were
instructed (so it is possible that some of the delay may have
been introduced by either the treating team or the funding com-
missioning organisation) but we do know that the case had been
in the hands of the CCG solicitors for some time when S’s
family approached us for help in mid-July 2015—at which
point we contacted the CCG solicitors directly to try to ﬁnd out
(on behalf of the family) what progress had been made. In sub-
sequent correspondence, one of the solicitors acting for the
CCG explained why the process of preparing an application can
be so time-consuming:
A difﬁculty that can be encountered with regard to acting for
CCGs in particular is that, whilst they fund and commission the
care, the care providers are separate organisations and the CCG
therefore has no direct control over the medical records, and
further none of the treating clinicians or medical practitioners are
employees of the CCG. This means that the CCG has a coordin-
ating role with numerous other organisations behind the scenes
and it is necessary to liaise with each of these numerous organisa-
tions, such as multiple NHS Trusts [the letter names three for
this case], GP surgeries, hospitals/nursing homes etc, to obtain
the relevant records and to undertake investigations, which can
be a time-consuming and unwieldy process. (Letter to authors
from CCG’s solicitor, 18 July 2016)
The CCG’s solicitor also told us that work on preparing the
case for court had been halted for some months while S was ill.
The solicitors say this was occasioned by the nurses caring for S
who had been asked to prepare statements for the application:
they “contacted the CCG and explained that they would have
to delay preparing their statements as S was very unwell and
their time was needed to provide care, notwithstanding that the
outcome for S was unclear” (letter to authors from CCG’s
solicitor, 18 July 2016). (Note: we do not have access to the
nurses’ perspective on this issue and it is not clear to us why
they were not provided with the support necessary to complete
this task in a timely manner.)
Given that this was a relatively straightforward case (with no
disagreement between family and clinicians) one might reason-
ably expect completion of the paperwork for the court applica-
tion to take no more than a few months (as it has done in other
cases eg, Re D discussed below). The 13-month gap between the
MDT’s decision to refer to Court and the lodging of the appli-
cation is simply unconscionable.
Avoidable delay 5: adjournment of the March 2016 hearing:
an additional 2-month delay resulting from concerns about
the quality of diagnostic evidence provided to the court
Once the application had been made in October 2015, the
judges involved approached proceedings with a clear sense of
urgency. This was evident even at the directions hearing
(December 2015) when the judge, Jackson J, listened to the
family’s concerns about the treatment of S and the protracted
journey that had ﬁnally bought the case to court and made clear
statements about the need to proceed efﬁciently from this point.
In an effort to avoid further delays he sought assurances that the
Ofﬁcial Solicitor would instruct his own independent expert
iiiRoyal College of Physicians (RCP) National Guidelines 2013: pp. 10–13.
Guidelines in the USA are different—allowing PVS to be diagnosed as
early as 3 months after a ‘non-traumatic’ injury.
Kitzinger J, Kitzinger C. J Med Ethics 2016;0:1–10. doi:10.1136/medethics-2016-103853 3
Current controversy
group.bmj.com on December 7, 2016 - Published by http://jme.bmj.com/Downloaded from 
only if review of the medical records suggested there was good
reason to do so. He also directed that any such report must be
ﬁled by early February to allow a swift move to a ﬁnal hearing
as soon as possible thereafter. The directions hearing was an
important milestone for the family. S’s mother said as she left
the hearing: “So, at least there is a time scale now—no decision,
but at least a time scale. The judge listened. I feel it’s been a
good day”.
In the event, however, the legal proceedings were to take
8 months from application to ﬁnal judgment—involving another
Figure 1 Timeline: summarising key points in background to Cumbria NHS Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) v Miss S and Ors [2016]
EWCOP 32.
Figure 2 Five key avoidable delay points in the ‘Miss S’ case.
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(ﬁfth) layer of delay in deciding the outcome for S, with particu-
larly distressing consequences for S’s family. Hopes of a speedy
process through the Court began to unravel once the Ofﬁcial
Solicitor reviewed the evidence provided by the CCG and
decided to instruct his own expert—particularly to look at
whether the drugs being given to the patient might have had a
sedative effect which interfered with an accurate diagnosis
(para 2(8)). Negotiations in January 2016 between this expert
and S’s consultant led to an agreement that it was appropriate
to wean her off sedation to allow further testing of her diagno-
sis—although this had not, in the consultant’s earlier view, been
necessary or in her best interests. The family then faced an
anxious wait prior to the hearing—scheduled for March 2016
—with the threat of further adjournment, which was now
requested by the CCG solicitors on the grounds that the CCG
no longer felt it had adequate evidence to support its original
case (made on the basis of a diagnosis of PVS).
This time period was particularly stressful for the family
because—in February 2016—S’s feeding tube (a Percutaneous
Endoscopic Gastrostomy (PEG)) became nonfunctional. It was
replaced in the face of family opposition and without taking the
decision back to the Court of Protection.iv Replacing the tube
felt ‘like assault’ to members of S’s family—and was particularly
distressing for her brother and her teenage daughter, both of
whom felt that S’s body had ‘rejected’ the feeding tube and that
this was an opportunity to ‘let nature to takes its course’
without implicating anyone in S’s death by actually withdrawing
the tube (a painful decision to be involved in for family
members even when they believe it is the correct one).4 As S’s
brother explained:
That PEG tube perishing, it’s kind of like it’s natural, nobody’s
forced it, nobody’s had to make a decision, it’s just nature taking
its course. This is the perfect opportunity just to, you know, start
the process, let her go. But no, we had to reinsert it.
The family became increasingly desperate after this. S’s
teenage daughter (who supported the court application) had ori-
ginally hoped not to be actively implicated in it. However, she
was the only family member eligible for legal aid and she now
felt pushed into a position where she had to become directly
involved, ﬁrst in the application for legal aid to fund ongoing
legal representation and then in attending the hearing. She also
wrote a letter to the judge about her mother: “It is wrong and
cruel to keep her body alive”, she wrote, “please respect her
wishes and let her be at peace”.
From the family’s point of view this was an ‘avoidable’ delay.
S’s mother, brother and daughter were adamant that S would
have wished to refuse life-extending treatment irrespective of
the diagnostic label attached to her condition. As S’s mother
stated in a letter to the judge:
I do not think that it would make any difference to [my daugh-
ter] if she was diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state
or a minimally conscious state. Either way, she would consider
that she does not have any quality of life. […] I have no doubt
that she would not wish to continue living in this condition.
At the March hearing, the judge, Hayden J, clearly took a
great deal of notice of this point of view (a fact much appre-
ciated by the family). He reiterated their arguments from the
bench, including acknowledging that S’s best interests might not
be the same as ﬁne-tuning the diagnosis. He also expressed
concern about delays—stating (according to our notes taken
during attendance at this hearing) that: “inordinate, unjustiﬁed
delay is inimical to S’s best interests whatever the outcome”.
Nevertheless, in the end he ‘reluctantly’ concluded that the
court was left “with very little alternative…given the state of the
expert evidence” (para. 14) but to adjourn until May to allow
sedation to be reduced and further examinations to be carried
out.
The judge made every effort to ensure a tight timetable at this
point. He ordered both of the experts who had already pro-
vided a PVS diagnosis to have a telephone conference with the
Ofﬁcial Solicitor’s chosen expert the next day and to put in
place a clear care plan to allow further assessments to be carried
out within 2 months.
The 2-month adjournment was presented by the judge as ‘not
long’ (especially in light of how long proceedings had taken
already). However, it was devastating for the three generations
of S’s family who had already endured an extremely difﬁcult
few months since the directions hearing and had travelled up to
Liverpool for the March hearing, hoping that a ﬁnal decision
might be made, as originally anticipated. Her brother came out
of the hearing shocked by the way the legal discussion had
developed. He felt the court had ‘lost sight’ of his sister as a
person:
The court case [at ﬁrst] was all about S’s best interests until [the
consultant appointed by the Ofﬁcial Solicitor] came into it. And
then the whole proceedings were taken over about was she min-
imally aware or was she PVS. When just before that we were
talking about her best interests. So S ﬂipped from being a human
being to a case study in my opinion.
He was particularly disturbed that an expert who had not
even visited his sister, or seen all her notes, was, in his view,
able to have such an effect on proceedings:
The inﬂuence that [the Ofﬁcial Solicitor’s expert] had on the
Court shocked me, because it changed the whole dynamic of the
conversations that were going on. And I was looking at my mam
[mother] thinking: “we’re not talking about [my sister] anymore,
we’re talking about somebody who they want to get a deﬁnitive
diagnosis from”.
The adjournment meant that, instead of a resolution, the
family faced ongoing limbo, with no guarantee that a ﬁnal judg-
ment would be made even at the May hearing if, at that point,
the diagnosis were still in question. For S’s mother, in particular,
after years of being told that all tests showed her daughter had
no awareness, the suggestion that this might not after all be true
was profoundly distressing. The subsequent weeks of waiting
for further conﬁrmation of her daughter’s diagnosis were ‘hor-
rendous’—in part because she was horriﬁed to think that S
might be feeling pain and distress (especially with sedation
reduced). She felt her daughter was being treated as ‘an experi-
ment, not a person’ adding: “They’ve forgotten about the
patient. I’m praying for a miracle—may compassion triumph”.
In the meantime, sitting at her daughter’s bedside during these
ivWe understand from the CCG solicitors that they were not involved in
the provision of legal advice in relation to PEG replacement. This
matter was dealt with by solicitors for a different NHS Trust who were
aware that there was a pending application with the Court of Protection.
The CCG solicitors were ‘surprised’ that the advice provided to the
treating clinicians appeared to have been to replace the PEG, despite the
opposition of the family.
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weeks between March and May 2016 she always left the door
open so staff could see her, because “you do think about the
pillow over the face…you do”.v
The short, but highly distressing adjournment to address
questions about the security of the PVS diagnosis was a ‘clinic-
ally purposive’ delay—in that its purpose was to seek further
diagnostic precision and certainty—but it was nonetheless
‘avoidable’ in that the sedation issue could perhaps have been
resolved prior to the case reaching court and in parallel to other
processes (eg, if the sedation issue had been discussed and a way
forward agreed with the Ofﬁcial Solicitor prior to the directions
hearing). Given that the SMART test conﬁrming PVS was
carried out in August 2014, there was obviously time, and there
surely could have been a mechanism, for questions to be raised
and addressed prior to the directions hearing in December
2015. A more fundamental issue, however, concerns how cases
for ANH-withdrawal from patients in disorders of consciousness
are framed and judged and the extent to which they hang on
determining precisely where a patient’s diagnosis lies on an
often-contested or ‘illusory’ continuum.7 8 Bringing the case for
withdrawal on the basis that the patient has a PVS diagnosis
may have contributed to avoidable delays, even though the PVS
diagnosis was ultimately judged to be secure. This opens up a
whole new discussion about the extent to which a deﬁnitive
diagnostic label is necessary to determine best interests—an
issue too extensive to review here, but which we will address in
another paper.
As it turned out, the newly commissioned tests, like all the
tests before them, indicated that S was in a PVS. Finally, 3 years
and nine months after her initial brain injury, the judge ruled
that ANH was not in S’s best interests and could be withdrawn.
She died on 4th June 2016. According to her mother, “it was
very peaceful”.
Having identiﬁed ﬁve causes of avoidable delay for this
patient, we now compare this case with others concerning ANH
withdrawal from patients in PVS, address how delays might be
avoided in future and reﬂect on the way forward.
SOME COMPARISONS WITH OTHER CASES
The length of time this case took to be resolved is sadly rather
typical of many cases that go through the courts. We have noted
in a previous study that clinical teams may not take the initiative
to ensure timely best interests decision-making and we have
highlighted the extent to which families who come to believe
their relative would want treatment withdrawn ﬁnd themselves
having to lobby on behalf of the patient.4 5 Many of the factors
that delayed the court application in the case of Miss S are
common to other cases: misinformation, lack of advance plan-
ning, delays in amassing medical records and statements from
across different organisations and care providers. The Miss S
case also captures two not-uncommon incidents which create
crises for families over and above the day-to-day, year-to-year
trauma of witnessing a relative subject to treatment it is believed
the patient would not want: (i) the PEG failing, and being
replaced, while proceedings to obtain a court judgment to
remove it are in process and (ii) belated disputes about diagno-
sis, which are particularly distressing if family members believe
—as in this case—that being minimally conscious would make
the situation still more unbearable.vi
However, the trajectories of cases coming to the courts need
not be subject to these delays, nor result in such distressing crisis
incidents. We can compare S’s case with a couple of (unusually
efﬁcient) recent instances where applications were made in a
smooth and timely manner. Both concerned patients (like S)
with non-traumatic brain injuries and in both cases ﬁnal judg-
ments to withdraw ANH were achieved less than a year after
injury.
▸ Re D [2012] EWHC 885 (COP) the injury occurred on 25
July 2011 and—after extensive testing—a best interests
meeting took place just two months later (September 2011)
at which it was agreed to make an application to the Court
of Protection for treatment withdrawal. The application—
supported by detailed neurological evidence from experts—
was made in December 2011 (5 months post-injury). The
case was heard (with up-to-date tests done at the 6 months
point) and withdrawal was approved at the end of March
2012, that is, a period of 8 months from injury to treatment
withdrawal. (One distinctive feature of this case which may
have contributed to the relatively speedy resolution was that
the patient had written a purported—though invalid—
advance decision to refuse treatment).
▸ In another recent case (unreported) the Trust sought advice
from solicitors within 6 weeks of the patient’s injury and fol-
lowed the advice they were given to conduct testing within
the 6-month period and make an early application to the
Court (5 months post-injury) supported by expert neuro-
logical evidence of the patient’s diagnosis and prognosis, and
with up-to-date review at the 6 month point: this again
resulted in a period of 8 months from injury to court
approval of the lawfulness of treatment-withdrawal.
Although every case has distinctive characteristics and may
involve its own speciﬁc challenges (eg, whether or not the
patient’s care is being paid for and delivered within the same
provider system), there appear to be no signiﬁcant differences
between these cases and the case of Miss S in relation to two
key features: in all three the eventual diagnosis (PVS) was the
same, and in all three the family and the treating clinicians
shared the same view as to the patient’s best interests. There is,
then, no ‘in principle’ reason why Miss S’s case could not have
followed a trajectory and timescale similar to these other two.
According to a specialist in neurological rehabilitation who
acted as expert witness in court there is no reason why she
could not have been diagnosed as PVS in February 2013 (since
interventions which can get in the way of assessing conscious-
ness—eg, ventilation and tracheostomy—had been removed by
then) and it would certainly have been possible to have a PVS
diagnosis and start preparing an application in April that year—
the point at which her mother wrote the letter pleading that
“her life not be prolonged unnecessarily”.
vOther families we have interviewed describe similar feelings in similar
situations, including one man who reports that the whole process of
getting to court for his severely brain injured mother had been
‘hideously slow’ but it was the late introduction of a report from the
Ofﬁcial Solicitor’s appointed expert questioning a PVS diagnosis which
‘was perhaps the most appalling individual event of the whole shebang’.
It was this, he believes, that triggered his father’s decision to kill the
patient and himself.
viOur broader research shows that for some families the suggestion that
their relative might be minimally conscious introduces hope for current,
or future, quality of life compatible with what their relative would have
wanted, or might come to accept, whereas for others it makes them
even more convinced that their relative would want to refuse all
life-extending treatment.2 This is one reason why best interests of
individual patients cannot be determined on the basis of diagnosis
alone: for some patients and their families speciﬁc diagnosis is highly
relevant and for others it is not.
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Insofar as delays for Miss S were caused by practical consid-
erations not relevant in the other two cases (such as locating full
medical records or obtaining statements), CCGs need to take
responsibility for identifying these causes of delay and for
ﬁnding practical solutions. In our earlier work4 5 we reported
that some families ﬁghting to bring applications to court believe
that proceedings have been deliberately protracted or obstructed
because of clinicians’ religious or ethical objections to treatment-
withdrawal, but we have no evidence to suggest this was so in
this case. Instead, delays seemed to have been caused by a com-
bination of: system fragmentation in the delivery of care; lack of
access to appropriate medical and legal expertise at key points; a
disjointed and ineffective system administered by professionals
who did not adequately understand—and/or were inadequately
supported within—the system; a lack of resilience in the system
to deal with difﬁculties as they occurred; communication break-
downs; and problems with the level of service commissioned,
especially given that prolonged disorders of consciousness are
relatively unusual (and cases for ANH withdrawal even more
so) such that most medical and legal teams lack experience in
this area (see ﬁgure 3).
In a lengthy conversation with S’s consultant after the case
was concluded, he identiﬁed problems in his own handling of
the situation and with the way in which the CCG handled
making the application. He also told us that he felt that the
need to go to court had got in the way of, rather than pro-
moted, his patient’s best interests. He felt guilty about what had
happened to S but said that he was under a lot of pressure and
sometimes gave priority to “more pressing concerns” and “did
not chase things as I should have”. He believed that, due to the
level of service commissioned, “we were not working as a multi-
disciplinary team who could meet regularly as we should do”.
He added, “it comes down to the commissioning. If you don’t
commission a service you rely on good will”. He also felt his
own knowledge of the patient, based on having looked after her
for several years, was given less status than that of the expert
witnesses called on by the Court, and that his expertise was
marginalised. In retrospect he wishes he had stood his ground in
asserting what he believed to be in his patient’s best interests—
and that he had attended the March 2016 hearing in person
and defended this position. It is impossible to know what effect
this would have had, but is worth noting that, in the course of
that hearing, the judge commented that S’s consultant appeared
to have ‘yielded’ to the view of the Ofﬁcial Solicitor’s expert
about the appropriate course of action rather than continuing to
assert his own view of his patient’s best interests, and had
perhaps ‘fallen on his sword’ unnecessarily (taken from our
notes from the hearing).
AVOIDING DELAYS: POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS AND THE WAY
FORWARD
The costs of continuing to give treatment that is not in the
patient’s best interests (and which the family believes the patient
would not want) are huge, both ﬁnancially and ethically.
Financially, the cost of keeping each PVS patient alive is around
£90 000 per year: this displaces alternative NHS services and
causes a loss of seven quality-adjusted life years from other
NHS patients who are in a position to beneﬁt from treatment.9
We estimate that the avoidable delays we have described in rela-
tion to this particular case resulted in an additional 3 years of
unwanted/futile treatment—at a cost of £270 000 or 21
quality-adjusted life years for other NHS patients. (This was on
top of the legal bills for the NHS, the costs of incidents such as
hospitalisation for PEG replacement, and the cost of legal aid
for the family).
Ethically, the delays resulted in S, the person ‘at the centre’ of
this story (para. 13), being subjected for years to treatment that
she would not have wanted and which was not in her best inter-
ests. In addition her family was subject to years of distress, and
to an unnecessarily agonising series of delays during the course
of the court hearings. The delays meant they had to do much
more than simply bear witness to S’s wishes, values and beliefs
(as required by the Mental Capacity Act 2005); instead they
were forced into the position of becoming active advocates for
withdrawing the feeding tube—potentially leaving them feeling
burdened, entirely wrongly, with responsibility for ‘causing’ her
death. The whole situation also caused unnecessary stress to
staff (including contributing to tensions between the family and
S’s health care team) and triggered moral distress too. Once
they come to believe that life-extending treatment is not in the
patient’s best interests, staff charged with continuing to deliver
treatment can experience their work as ethically problematic—
still more so if they are actively involved in reinserting or
replacing feeding tubes under these circumstances. Legally,
giving treatment that is not in the patient’s best interests may be
regarded as assault or battery (Bland [1993] AC 789 per Lord
Browne-Wilkinson at para. 883). In an important ruling subse-
quent to the Mental Capacity Act, it was clearly stated that it is
not lawful to give treatment that is not in the patient’s best
interests:
[T]he focus is on whether it is in the patient’s best interests to
give the treatment, rather than on whether it is in his best inter-
ests to withhold or withdraw it. If the treatment is not in his best
interests, the court will not be able to give its consent on his
behalf and it will follow that it will be lawful to withhold or
withdraw it. Indeed, it will follow that it will not be lawful to
give it. (Aintree [2013] UKSC 67)
It is not surprising that some staff, as well as family members,
were deeply troubled by what was done to Miss S.
Our case study approach in this paper suggests that efforts to
solve the problem of delays could focus on three areas. First, it
is important to improve the way those who fund and provide
care consider best interests in relation to ANH-provision and—
also, where necessary/appropriate—how they then refer cases
and prepare applications for withdrawal. Second, if we work
Figure 3 Factors that may obstruct timely withdrawal of the feeding
tube from a permanent vegetative state patient when family and
treating team agree that treatment is not in the patient’s best interests.
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with the widespread assumption that court applications are
required before ANH can be lawfully withdrawn from patients
in permanent vegetative or minimally conscious states, then
there needs to be careful consideration given to legal practice in
relation to ‘best interests’ and the role of the Ofﬁcial Solicitor in
considering the weight to be placed on patients’ own wishes.
Third, at a more fundamental level, there is the need to question
the perceived requirement for a court application to ‘authorise’
withdrawal from such patients—since this lies at the root of
‘avoidable delays’. We will consider each in turn.
Provision and inspection of care for patients in prolonged
disorders of consciousness
It would be helpful to create a register of patients in prolonged
disorders of consciousness in order to ensure that appropriate
specialist resources and follow-up are available for them and to
ensure that those who fund and provide care for these patients
(and their legal teams) are aware of the national clinical guide-
lines, including timetables for action. It would also be important
to provide access to expert co-ordination (eg, perhaps a case
manager focused on timely best interests decision-making)10 and
give support and training. In addition, ofﬁcial monitoring pro-
cesses might also usefully incorporate systems that foreground
best interests. Annual reviews of continuing health care funding,
and regular inspections of care homes, do not currently rou-
tinely check that the ANH being provided to the patient is in
their best interests. If either of these routine inspections were to
ﬂag up such issues, court applications might be started much
sooner. Despite the fact that no court in England and Wales has
ever found ANH to be in the best interests of PVS patients, such
treatment is routine and is delivered to up to 16 000 PVS
patients in the UK11 on a daily basis. This practice is supported
by an organisational infrastructure which includes CCGs, insur-
ance companies, and NHS continuing healthcare funding as
well as the (largely ‘independent sector’) business of long-term
care home provision. Those delivering, paying for, or receiving
payment for, the treatment of PVS patients with ANH do not
seem to fear prosecution for offences against the person, and
the law seems tacitly to condone this. It may be that attention
could be focused—and action galvanised—if a legal case for
battery were to be brought against those who commission or
provide on-going treatment to PVS patients without ensuring
timely expert assessments and decision-making about whether
that treatment is actually in the patient’s best interests.12 A case
could also be made for breach of Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights on the basis that treatment repre-
sents an unlawful interference with the patient’s autonomy.
Legal practice in relation to ‘best interests’
Legal practice in relation to ‘best interests’ and the weight to be
placed on the patients’ own wishes is the second key area where
efforts to solve the problems highlighted in this case study
might focus. There is of course no deﬁnition in the Mental
Capacity Act as to the priority (or otherwise) to be given to the
person’s own wishes in determining their ‘best interests’—it is
one factor among others. Several post-Aintree cases show that
the judiciary of the Court of Protection are increasingly willing
to engage with the wishes of the individual, even when weighed
against ‘sanctity of life’ considerations, but “at law the weight
placed on the person’s wishes, feelings, values and beliefs still
remains largely within the discretion of the best interests deci-
sion maker: and the Mental Capacity Act 2005 does not require
an explicit justiﬁcation for acting contrary to them”.13
The role of the Ofﬁcial Solicitor in applications to the Court
of Protection has become a cause for concern with the suggestion
that he is more “foe” than “litigation friend” to those who may
lack capacity in so far as he advocates not for what the patient
wants (or would have wanted) but for what he independently
considers to be in the patient’s ‘best interests’ (in accordance with
s5 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005). This can sometimes, as in
this case, appear (eg, to the patient’s family) as if the patient’s
wishes, feelings, values and beliefs are being sidelined and it can
create an ‘adversarial’ context for decision-making. In particular,
the perceived likelihood that the Ofﬁcial Solicitor will oppose
treatment-withdrawal in all but the most clear-cut cases (regard-
less of reports of the patient’s own wishes) creates a context in
which continued treatment becomes the default option.
In addition, it has been widely noted that the ‘best interests’
standard is not compliant with the UN Committee on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and discussions conducted as
part of the Essex Autonomy Project have proposed as “a good
point of departure” that there should be a “defeasible presump-
tion that actions taken in the best interests of P requires making
decisions that achieve the outcome that P would prefer”.15 The
Law Commission has recently proposed that section 4 of the
Mental Capacity Act 2005 “should be amended to establish that
decision-makers should begin with the assumption that the
person’s past and present wishes and feelings should be deter-
minative of the best interests decision”. This development
would offer an important opportunity to shift the current focus
of court cases about patients in prolonged disorders of con-
sciousness from a preoccupation with the person’s diagnosis and
prognosis, to a full consideration of what the person would
have wanted (as testiﬁed by those who knew them).
The perceived requirement for a court application
The perceived requirement for a court application lies at the
root of ‘avoidable delays’. Although the CCG that commissions
care bears ultimate responsibility for many of the delays we
identiﬁed in relation to S, these delays were shaped by the per-
ceived need to go to court. Instead of the clinical team consult-
ing with those close to the patient and making and enacting the
best interests decision as they do with other patients, they
became enmeshed with lawyers and legal procedures. This case
study highlights how going to court can distance the team
caring for the patient from decision-making and trigger
complex lines of communication and decision–making (eg, divi-
sions between who is providing care and who is commissioning
care). The (apparent) need to go to court to withdraw such
treatment conveys a message that providing ANH is the correct
position unless and until a court rules otherwise. This can lead
to an abdication of best interests decision-making by the clinical
team, who may feel that it has been placed outside their jurisdic-
tion. Going to court necessarily causes a time lag between clini-
cians coming to the conclusion that treatment is not in the
patient’s best interests, and actually being able to act in accord-
ance with this assessment. Clinicians may therefore be left
feeling that decision-making about ANH is not an urgent issue
to resolve; alternatively, they seek to circumvent the need to go
to court by trying to allow the patient to die via decisions they
believe they are able lawfully to make without court applica-
tions, such as withholding antibiotics. A court application will
always, of necessity, involve a further time lag in the process
(between application and judgment)—but this case study illus-
trates how the delay it creates can stretch backward into the
process, creating avoidable delays long before the application is
ever made (see ﬁgure 3).
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In addition, the Court seems recently to have inadvertently
caused delays as an unintended consequence of rebukes to solici-
tors representing CCGs for failing to prepare cases well. Recent
case law (Shefﬁeld Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v
TH; St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v P and Q) has been crit-
ical of applications launched ‘precipitously’ before a secure diag-
nosis is in place. Despite clear differences between these cases
and the consensus withdrawal cases described in this article,
legal teams have reacted with a great deal of anxiety about
“dotting the ‘i’s and ‘crossing the ‘t’s’” before bringing a case to
court. This contributes to a clear tension insofar as, on the one
hand legal teams are keen to ensure that everything the Court
might require is put in place before the court hearing, and, on
the other hand, their lack of experience (in many cases) with
what is in fact required. Current guidance (eg, via Practice
Directions to the Court of Protection Rules) is minimal or non-
existent. If it continues to be perceived as necessary to take all—
or at least some of—these cases to court, then a checklist of rele-
vant materials and access to expert advice for CCG legal teams
would be extremely beneﬁcial. This could be alongside clear
benchmarking about the target timetable for preparing the
application to court, advance consultation with the Ofﬁcial
Solicitor and/or a pool of agreed independent experts to
conﬁrm diagnoses (with a limit on the number to be involved
unless special circumstances pertain). Factors that may facilitate
timely treatment-withdrawal are displayed in ﬁgure 4.
CONCLUSION
The continued provision of life-prolonging treatment for
patients in PVS—regardless of their prior expressed wishes—is
widely acknowledged as a problem and a range of solutions has
been offered, each of which displaces the problem onto
different stakeholders. One solution is for individuals who
would not want to be kept alive in PVS to write Advance
Decisions refusing life-prolonging treatment in the event of
ending up in such a condition;16 17 another is for better use to
be made of the ‘window of opportunity’ for death4 at different
points along the trajectory that results in such states (eg, death
via withholding or withdrawing treatment in critical care).
Collectively, the body of work of which this article is a part
addresses these different proposed solutions and explores the
interface between them. On the basis of this particular case
study, however, we suggest that the single most effective way of
addressing the problem of ‘avoidable delays’ in withdrawing
unwanted/futile treatment from existing PVS patients would be
to abolish the (perceived) need for a court hearing in cases
where there is general agreement (as in the case examined here)
as to the patient’s best interests. We are hopeful that this may be
addressed in the next iteration of the Practice Directions and
that it will be made clear that doctors are not under a legal duty
to seek the court’s approval before withdrawing ANH. Recent
legal analysis questions whether (as the current iteration of
Practice Direction 9E to the Court of Protection Rules suggests)
it is really legally required for doctors to seek the approval of
the court before they can lawfully withdraw ANH from patients
in disorders of consciousness: the conclusion is that “It seems to
be plain that it is not, and cannot be”.18
If it were made clear that—for PVS as for other patients—
doctors were able (following assessments properly compliant
with the Mental Capacity Act 2005) to withdraw treatment not
in the patient’s best interests without recourse to the courts,
many of the delays identiﬁed in this case study could be
avoided. We would then need revised Guidelines from the Royal
College of Physicians and training for clinicians and education
Figure 4 Factors that may facilitate
timely withdrawal of the feeding tube
from a permanent vegetative state
patient when family and treating team
agree that treatment is not in the
patient’s best interests.
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for lawyers to ensure that treatment is withdrawn in a timely
manner. Appropriate support (as suggested above) will also
need to be available to clinicians and legal teams to expedite
those court applications that are still required where there is
doubt about the patient’s best interests. (The cases that will still
need to go to court would beneﬁt from the extra court time and
expertise released via this strategy too). Returning treatment-
withdrawal from patients in prolonged disorders of conscious-
ness to normal medico-legal practice, and allowing it to follow
the same best interests procedures as are employed for all other
patients (without valid and applicable Advance Decisions to
refuse treatment) does not mean that such decisions will be
trouble-free in future. They will be subject to all the same difﬁ-
culties that beset best interests decision-making generally, but
released from the special problems currently imposed by the
perceived requirement for court approval.
Ethical debates concerning provision of ANH to PVS patients
have been well rehearsed in the quarter century since Bland (eg,
in this journal).5 7 17 19–21 In the particular case analysed here,
it should have been straightforward. No new ethical or legal
issues were at stake and every expert who examined Miss S—
before and after sedation had been reduced—agreed she was in
PVS. Ultimately the court judgment concerning S was uncontro-
versial and has, at the time of publication, attracted very little
attention, either in the mass media or in on-line forums where
the ethics of end-of-life decision-making are debated. The
family are determined to make their story public and we are
hoping this article will help inform further public and profes-
sional debate once it is published (We are also grateful to the
Transparency Project at Cardiff University for putting us in
touch with a journalist who might be interested in covering the
story).
This mundane account of a catalogue of delays and of the
complex dynamics between medical and legal practices is
unlikely to capture the imagination of bioethicists. There is no
central moral conundrum, no grand theoretical divergence
between opposing parties. Yet this is the ordinary quotidian
reality for PVS patients, their families, and their health care
teams. The ‘devil is in the detail’ that constitutes the context in
which practical ethical decision-making concerning these
patients must be addressed and implemented—in relation to
which we must identify solutions to avoid breaching the human
rights of these patients in future. There is a clear need for inten-
sive bioethical engagement with these issues and for those who
provide care for, and frame the law about, these patients, to
respond to the challenges identiﬁed.
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